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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

A. Invited members' attention to the meeting beginning at 2:15, 3 August, on unauthorized disclosures. aid the primary purpose of the meeting was to give Community Public Affairs Officers opportunity to hear Mr. Casey speak on his concerns about unauthorized disclosures and engage in a dialogue with him on their role in trying to control the problem. Following this discussion with the DCI, attendees would see the first presentation of a 15-minute videotape by Mr. Casey illustrating damage from leaks and advising of means by which the Community can help stop them. That in turn would be followed by an 8-minute, stand-up follow-on by and by a showing of videotape excerpts from a TV panel discussion on the press and government secrecy. The DCI's videotaped presentation and stand-up follow-on would be the package to be taken to the Community to alert	25X1 25X1 25X1
senior officials to the scope of the problem and to enlist their help in combatting it.	25X1
B. Reported that on 25 July the DCI referred the proposed revision of DCID 1/14 to the National Foreign Intelligence Council for comments on the issue of whether investigative coverage should be reduced from 15 to 10 years. said he did not know when the NFIC would meet on this matter.	25 X 1
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C. Noted that members were sent copies of the revised FY 1985 SECOM budget request reflecting reduction in the guidance level and inputs from members and the subcommittees on high-priority projects. Said he had not heard of any further developments on the FY 1985 budget. He noted	25X1
that the appeal of the Senate Ove <u>rsight Committee</u> 's recommended cut of our FY 1984 budget was still pending.	25 X 1
D. Advised that the SECOM staff, in consultation with the Computer Security Subcommittee, had prepared for Dr. Ruth Davis a set of preliminary comments on computer security matters that she should address and that SECOM should deal with through the subcommittee	25X1
E. Stated that, in accordance with NSDD-84, two nondisclosure forms, one	
for SCI and the other for collateral, have been developed. They have been sent to National Security Council members for approval, and should be ready for promulgation during August 1983.	25 X 1
F. Reported that all members had sent in their vote sheets on DIA's request for SECOM approval for DIA to release to the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University classified material bearing DCID 1/7 restrictive caveats said a majority of members nonconcurred. He noted that several members questioned the need for this waiver, citing DIA's	25 X 1
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statement of expectations of possible problems, without identifying any actual experience. Other member comments addressed the lack of comparability between this laboratory and the GOCOs under the Department of Energy. said the vote showed that SECOM is not prepared to grant the request.	25X1
ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes	
In the absence of requests for change, the minutes of the 29 June 1983 meeting were approved as written.	25X1
ITEM 2 Subcommittee Reports	
A. Computer Security - reported that the subcommittee discussed possible overlap between existing organizations with computer security responsibilities and new ad hoc or short-term bodies charged to address the subject. He said subcommittee members thought it would be useful for them to restate their charter and provide it to the Community, following SECOM approval, to ensure broad understanding of their role.	25X1
advised that efforts continue to develop a new draft revision of DCID 1/16, with particular reference to agreed definitions of modes of operation. He noted that management attention is being focused on computer security inputs	25X1
to the FY 84 and 85 budgets.	25X1
B. Personnel Security - observing that this was last meeting, complimented him for his outstanding performance as subcommittee chairman. He characterized as responsive and	25X1 25X1 25X1
innovative. and said it had been a distinct pleasure to work with him. thanked subcommittee members for their excellent support of him and the SECOM. was then introduced as the new subcommittee chairman.	25X1 25X1 25X1
C. Security Awareness - introduced as the new chairman. said he had talked with every subcommittee member and was impressed by their positive attitude. He advised that their next meeting would be on 24 August, and that he hoped to maintain a monthly meeting	25X1 25X1
schedule.	25X1
D. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures - reported that the Audio Countermeasures Working Group (ACWG) completed a guidelines paper on use of automated telephone systems in SCI facilities and distributed the paper to the Community for use by government and industry. He advised that the ACWG	25X1
NSA and Mr. Terrazas of FBI had prepared for Captain Boyle of the Capitol Police a guidelines paper on shielded enclosures. He noted that a 12-by-20 foot shielded enclosure is contemplated for installation in the Hart	25X1 25X1
House Annex 2 might make it possible for the Army to provide technical assistance on the Hill to the Capitol Police. He said screening of the 12 Capitol Police officers nominated for TSCM training had identified 6 to 8 of them who	25X1
appeared capable of completing the training course at He noted that is prepared to train these officers as a group in the fall of 1983.	25X1 25X1
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said a potential problem is that the Capitol Police might not want to let all of the 6 to 8 leave at the same time for their training. He advised that the schedule was such that they could not take them in small increments at different times. He said assistance by the Legislative Liaison Staff might be needed to resolve this concern and ensure that the Capitol Police would dedicate the officers to be trained to the performance of TSCM tasks as a primary duty. Mr. Dean advised that his conversation with Chief Powell and Captain	25X1
Boyle indicated they were not disposed to let the whole group of officers	
leave for training at one time said his understanding of the original oral agreement with the Capitol Police was that the Community	25 X 1
would provide a single course for all who were to be trained. stressed the need to work out satisfactory arrangements with the Capitol Police on all aspects of their assumption of responsibility for TSCM on the	25X1
Hill in order to avoid the Community losing confidence about these arrangements. Col. Press said the Secretary of the Army was concerned that Army	
participation in the training on the Hill could be misconstrued as giving	
the appearance of "bugging Congress." He advised that the Secretary would	
probably want Congressional leadership briefed to avoid this potential.	_25X1
reported that construction plans fo expansion were going well. He said the 95% design review had been done in late July, and that the cost figure was solidifying at about \$400,000, plus \$56,000 for the architect and contract monitoring. He noted that they plan to close the school from	25X1
November to January for constructionadvised that in the last year or so there were three cases of ALTEC amplifiers carrying sensitive conversations out of hearing rooms in the Rayburn Building on the Hill. Mr. Rubino	25X1
asked if the amplifiers had been examined to determine if they had been tampered with. said they hadn't, and cited lack of authority on the part of the Community to conduct such examinations. Mr. Rubino suggested we try to prompt the Congress to take action in such cases by advising them of specific problems in graphic terms. He and Mr. Dean agreed to discuss how best to handle this. Mr. Dean expressed his concern as to whether the Capitol Police are prepared at present to make the specific commitments needed for them to be able to do an adequate TSCM job. He suggested that if negotiations with them don't result in satisfactory commitments, the Community may need to continue indefinitely the practice of each agency providing its own TSCM	25X1
coverage of sensitive testimony. said that was not an attractive	25X1
alternative, as the old practice was not adequate and the Community could benefit from having a focal point on the Hill to deal with.	25X1
asked to compile a list of actual and potential problems associated with TSCM on the Hill for use in briefing the DDCI and getting his guidance.	25X1
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E. Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations - noted that SECOM members approved at the June meeting the concept of a short-term study	25X1
of leaks; and that and others had offered to detail officers to	_25X1
conduct the study subject to development of an acceptable work plan.	_25X1
then briefed members on a work plan, proposed study methodology and a form designed to assist study personnel in capturing basic data relevant to the study. He said the study should begin in September, and he discussed questions which he hopes the study would answer. He advised that the results of the	

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study would be reviewed by UDIS to determine what follow-up was needed (e.g., investigation in particular cases, reallocation of security efforts). Col. asked what would be the length of the detail for officers to work on the study. said he thought several months would be needed to complete the study, but noted that work requirements possibly could be met by a series of detailees each serving for a relatively short period (e.g., a month). advised that UDIS was working on a draft charter for the subcommittee.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
ITEM 3 New Business	
A. noted that controversy over the polygraph during Congressional action on the Defense Authorization Bill was of interest to SECOM. Mr. Mitchell advised that the Chaffee Amendment held DoD to polygraph practices in effect the day before issuance of Mr. Carlucci's memo authorizing new practices; and required Congressional hearings no later than April 1984 to address, inter alia, the reliability of the polygraph and identification of recent leaks that heightened management concern to the point that they believed	25X1
broader use of the polygraph was needed said he and the NSA General Counsel had briefed some Hill personnel on the polygraph, and found many of them ill-informed on the subject. He advised that Senator Jackson seemed to view DoD's planned expansion of polygraph use as an objectionable new burden on military personnel. He noted that much of the Congressional concern focused on	25X1
NSDD-84's language on the polygraph said the polygraph has some formidable adversaries on the Hill noting SECOM's previous request to the Personnel Security Subcommittee to defer action on a study of	25X1 25X1
the polygraph, said the scheduled Congressional hearings made it important that SECOM actively address the subject aid current attacks on the polygraph focused on two areas: use of the polygraph to screen military assignees; and use of it in leak investigations. He stated that he thought we could be hurt by offering the results of a validity study of the polygraph because opponents could obtain testimony from experts opposed to the polygraph and could also cite "horror" stories about its abuse. He suggested that we would be better served by an anecdotal approach - one in which we would cite a large number of cases in which the polygraph had identified specific and	25X1
consequential security weaknessesadvised that Senator Jackson had told the DDCI that he was troubled by inconsistencies in use of the polygraph by Community agencies, and that he thought those inconsistencies should	25X1
be resolved. said he thought inconsistencies were usually the result of individual agencies doing what circumstances permitted them to do in	25 X 1
terms of polygraph use.	25X1
called members' attention to the issue of what we wanted the Personnel Security Subcommittee to do regarding the polygraph. Several spoke in favor of an anecdotal effort focused on experiences in which the poly- graph was the unique or most significant means of identifying serious security	25 X 1
problems commented that he thought laboratory studies of the polygraph were counterproductive. Col. Press said the Army could probably contribute some counterespionage cases illustrating the value of the polygraph. Mr. Allen observed that the study could also illustrate cases in which the	25X1
polygraph was the means of clearing individuals of suspicion.	25 X 1

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indicated tohis understanding of the SECOM consensus on the scope of the desired study. A brief final discussion focused on the possible need for a guidance memorandum to NSDD-84 to clarify its provision on use of the polygraph by narrowing its application to specific issues and specific				
suspects.				
Bcommented that the final version of the IG/CM countermeasures study gave meaningful recognition to the responsibilities and	25 X 1			
accomplishments of SECOM. He said thanks were due to the SECOM subcommittees for their good work in providing timely, high quality comments on the drafts of the study.				
ITEM 4 Next Meetings				
The Chairman reminded members that the next regular meeting is scheduled for 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, 14 September, at CIA Headquarters. He advised that we would then need to identify and agree on agenda topics for discussion and				
decision at our annual, overnight seminar, scheduled for 11-12 October	25 X 1 25 X 1			
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Executive Secretary				

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5 August 1983

SECOM CALENDAR

August					
02	UDIS	10:00	7D-32 Hqs.		
03	SECOM	10:00	4E-64 Hqs.		
8-12	PSWG Seminar	All Week	STAT		
15-19	Adjudicators' Course	All Week			
24	ACWG	09:30	Westgate		
24	Security Awareness	10:00	4E-64 Hqs		
	Septem	ber			
13	UDIS	10:00	7D-32 Hqs.		
14	SECOM	10:00	4E-64 Hqs.		
20	Computer Security	09:30	Jefferson		
22	R&D	01:30	Jefferson		
<u>October</u>					
11 & 12	SECOM Seminar	Two Days	STAT		
31-4 Nov	Adjudicators' Course	All Week			

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